Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1962

G. L. Hackett & Co. v. Thompson Flying Service of
Salt Lake City, Inc. : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Hanson & Garrett; Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent;
Christensen and Jensen; Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Hackett v. Thompson Flying Service, No. 9613 (Utah Supreme Court, 1962).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3996

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the
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G. L. HACKE~TT & COMPANY,--_a .
'
corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

-vs.THOMPSON FLYING SERVICE
OF SALT LAKE CITY, INC.,

No. 9613

Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third Distriet Court
for Salt Lake County
HoN. RAY VANCoTT, JR., Judge.
CHRISTENSEN AND JENSEN
By RAY R. CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellant
1205 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake 'City, Utah
EDWARD M. GARRETT
Attorney for Plaintiff .and Respondent
520 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

G. L. HACKETT & COMPANY, a
corporation,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

-vs.THOMPSON

Case No.
No. 9613

FLYING SERVI·CE

OF SALT LAKE CITY, INC.,
Defendant an.d Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for property damage to an airplane
owned by plaintiff's assignor, arising out of a fire at an
airplane hangar operated by the defendant.
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DISPOSITION IN LO\VER COURT
The case was tried to a jury. From a verdict and
judgment for the plaintiff, defendant appeals.

RELIEF SOUGI-IT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks a reversal of the judgment and entry of judgment in its favor as a matter of law, or that
failing, a new trial.

STATEMENT OF FkCTS
Plaintiff brought the present action in two counts,
claiming as assignee of one Gary Brimhall, the owner of
a certain Bellanca Airplane. (R.l-2). Plaintiff's first
count is based upon the theory of conversion. (R.1.);
the second count is based upon the theory of negligence.
(R. 1-2). Defendant by its answer admitted that a fire
occurred in the hangar where the plane was stored. (R. -±.)
All of the other material allegations of the complaint were
denied. (R. 3-4).
At trial, the only evidence offered by the plaintiff
was the testimony of Gary Brilnhall, the owner of the airplane in question. The sum and substance of Brimhall's
testimony was that he arranged with defendant for the
rental of a "T" hangar at l\1:unicipal Airport #1. It was
his understanding of the agreement that he rented the No.
1 "T" hangar, and had the right to the exclusive use of
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it. Defendant had no right to go into it for any purpose.
Neither did anyone else have a right to go into it for any
purpose. l:-le was not paying for airplane storage, but
for ,hangar space. He parked his car in the hangar when
he was flying the plane. ( R. 28-29).
Brimhall last flew the plane around Thanksgiving
of 1960. (R. 26). Sorne time thereafter, the exact or ap-proximate date of which was not established, Brimhall
discovered that his plane had been rernoved from the "T·''
hangar and placed in a larger hangar owned and operated
by defendant, with several other planes. (R. 26). Brimhall made no cornplaint whatsoever to defendant about
this and he assumed that the plane was rernoved because
his account was delinquent. Admittedly, at the time
of the fire, his account was delinquent in approximately
the amount of $2200. (R. 26-27). He never asked permission to fly the plane after it was removed to the large
hangar. He admitted that he was never refused permission to fly it, and that he made no protest to defendant
concerning the removal of the plane. (R. 27).
The entire thn1st of Brimhall's testimony was to
the effect that the relationship between himself and defendant was one of landlord and tenant, and not of bailment or storage. He regarded himself as the lessee of
•'T" Hangar #1, and he interpreted the removal of the
plane from "T" Hangar #1 as a conversion of the plane.
Upon the presentation of Brimhall's testimony, the
plaintiff rested. (R. 32). Defendant likewise rested with-
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out having offered any evidence at all. (R 32). Promptly
thereafter, defendant moved for a directed verdict on
both counts of plaintiff's complaint for the following
grounds and reasons :
A.

As to the first count:

1.

That there was no evidence of a conversion; and

2. That defendant had a right, as lienor, to take
possession of the plane. (R. 32).
B.

As to the negligence count:

1. That there was no evidence of any contract of
bailment between the owner and the defendant;
2. That there was no evidence of any negligence on
the part of the defendant; and
3. That there was no evidence that any negligence
on the part of defendant caused the fire. (R. 33).
After argument this motion \Yas denied by the court,
(R. 33), and the case was submitted to the jury on both
of plaintiff's theories. (R. 61-67). With regard to the
negligence count, the Court, by its instruction No. 6,
charged the jury as follows:
"If you find from the evidence in this case
that the relationship between Briniliall and the
Th01npson Flying Service was that of bailment
and, if you further find that Brimhall's airplane
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"·as da1naged as a result of a fire while it was
in the possession of the defendant you may infer
frmn that fact that the defendant was negligent
and that his negligence was the proximate cause of
the dmnage to the airp]ane. Such an inference
does not mnount to a preponderance of the evidence but you may use such inference as a basis
for finding by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant was negligent." (R. 67).
Defendant duly excepted to the giving of said instruction. (R. 3±). Defendant by its request No. 11, requested the Court to charge the jury as follows:
"You are instructed that the mere fact that a
fire occurred, standing alone, is no evidence of
any negligence on the part of defendant." (R.51)
Exception was likewise taken to the court's refusal
to grant this request. (R. 34).
The jury returned a verdict favorable to the defendant and against the plaintiff on the first count, that is,
the conversion count, and in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant on the second, or negligence count,
in the stipulated anwunt of the damages, less the agreed
set-off for storage charges, or a total of $4,997 .55. (R. 75).
Defendant made a timely motion to set aside the
verdict and judgment and to enter judgment for the
defendant, or in the alternative for a new trial (R. 77),
which motion was in due course argued to the court and
denied. (R. 78). This appeal followed. (R. 79)
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STATE~1ENT

OF POINTS UPON \VHICH
APPELLANT RELIES
POINT I.

PLAINTIFF HAVING TRIED THE CASE ON THE
THEORY OF CONVERSION, WAS ESTOPPED TO RELY UPON THE THEORY OF NEGLIGENCE AS A GROUND OF
RECOVERY.
POINT II.
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT 'TO SUPPORT A
VERDICT AND JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF
AND AGAINST THE DEFENDANT UPON THE THEORY
OF NEGLIGENCE, AND 'THE VERDICT AND JUDGMENT
ARE CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE, AND CONTRARY
TO LAW.
POINT III.
THE COURT DID NOT CORRECTLY INSTRUCT THE
JURY, AS TO THE RIGHTS OF PLAINTIFF, OR AS TO
THE DUTIES OF DEFENDANT, OR AS TO THE LAW OF
BAILMENT APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE.

ARGUJ\1ENT
POINT I.
PLAINTIFF HAVING TRIED THE CASE ON THE
THEORY OF CONVERSION, WAS ESTOPPED TO RELY UPON THE THEORY OF NEGLIGENCE AS A GROUND OF
RECOVERY.

The position consistently taken by the plaintiff in
this case, in its pleadings, at pretrial, and at trial, has
been that the relationship between the owner Brimhall
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and the defendant was that of landlord and tenant, and
that when the defendant reuwved the owner's airplane
fr01n the · 'T" hangar and placed it in another hangar,
defendant was guilty of conversion. Upon this theory
the case was tried. This was the burden and effect of
the only proof offered by plaintiff at trial, the testimony
of the owner Brinlhall, and having elected to proceed
upon that theory, plaintiff was estopped to rely upon
the theory of negligence, based upon a bailment relationship.
Although there is no extensive authority on this
point, so far as our research reveals, one recent Ohio
case fairly indicates the rule. United Fire Insurance Co.
v. Paramount Fnr Service, Inc., 168 Ohio St. 431, 156
NE2d 121. In that case the owner had bailed her fur for
storage with the defendant. The original bailor, without
the authority of the owner, had entered into a subcontract of baihnent with another. \Vhile the fur was
in the possession of the sub-bailee, it vvas lost or destroyed. Plaintiff proceeded against the original bailee
upon the theory of conversion. However, recovery against
the bailee was lin1ited to the sum of $100, that being the
agreed value of the cost according to the contract of
baihuent. Plaintiff then sought to recover against the
sub-bailee upon the theory of negligence. The court held
that having elected to treat the original bailee as a converter, the owner could not take the inconsistent position
of suing the second bailee for loss resulting from negligence.
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Although the present case does not involve separate
hailees, the logic of the Ohio Court in that case is equally
applicable here. Having elected to proceed against the
defendant upon the theory of conversion, plaintiff is
estopped to rely on the inconsistent theory of negligence,
arising out of a relationship entirely different from tl1at
attempted to be proved by plaintiff at trial.
POINT II.
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A
VERDICT AND JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF
AND AGAINS'T THE DEFENDANT UPON THE 'THEORY
OF NEGLIGENCE, AND 'THE VERDICT AND JUDGMENT
ARE CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE, AND CONTRARY
TO LAW.

Plaintiff, having alleged and relied upon, and having
attempted to prove, a contract of landlord and tenant,
cannot now claim that the original contract was one of
bailment for hire. If there was any bailment whatsoever,
it was a constructive bailment resulting from the failure
of defendant to conllilence foreclosure proceedings on its
landlord's lien within 30 days after termination of the
tenancy relationship. As heretofore noted there is no
evidence in the record as to the time when the plane
was removed from the "T" hangar to the big hangar,
and therefore there is no evidence, much less a preponderance of the evidence, from which a jury could find
that the 30 day period had elapsed, and that defendant
had become a constructive bailee. Assuming, however,
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that the :30 day period had elapsed, defendant, if a bailee
at all, \n>Uld be only a constructive bailee, that is, a
gratuitous bailee.
This rule is also expressed in the case of Unite,d Fire
Insunrnce Co. v. Pantrnount Fur Service, Inc., 168 Ohio
St. -:1:31, 156 NE2d 121. The court there said:
''Where otherwise than by a mutual contract
of bailment, one person has lawfully acquired the
possession of personal property of another, the
one in possession is, by operation of law, generally
treated as a bailee of such property and may
therefore reasonably be referred to as a constructive bailee. . . "
See also Armored Car Service, Inc. v. First National
Bank, (Fla. App.), 114 So. 2d 431, where the court said:
"Therefore, where the possession of one's personal property passes to another by mistake, accident or through force of circumstances under
which the law imposes upon the recipient thereof
the duty and obligation of a bailee, when there is
a lack of a meeting of the minds, an absence of any
voluntary tmdertaking, and no reasonable basis
for implying an interest of an Inutual benefit,
the baihnent resulting is a constructive bailment
and gratuitious."
Defendant, if a bailee at all, was a constructive bailee, or gratuitous bailee, and as such owed the owner a
duty only of slight care, or stated differently, would he
liable only for gross negligence in the storage of the airplane. The rule is stated in 6A A1n. J ur., 363, et seq.,
Bailments, § 257, as follows:
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''Authorities following the rule that a bailee
acting without reward is liable only in case of
gross negligence, viewed as a failure to exercise
slight care or diligence, have held that the care
required of such a bailee is not to he measured by
that which a reasonably prudent man, or a person
of ordinary prudence and care, would exercise,
with reference to his own property under similar
circumstances, and that such a bailee is not bound
to ordinary diligence or that which the generality
of mankind use in their own concerns.''
~

To the same effect, see 6A Am. Jur. 360-1, Bailments,
254.
See also 8 ·C.J.S. 278, Bailments, ~ 28:
"It is ordinarily stated that where a bailment
is for the sole benefit of the bailor, the bailee is
liable only for gross negligence or bad faith....
Primarily, gross negligence connotes the absence
of slight care or diligence; and taking ordinary
diligence or care and ordinary negligence as the
Inean of the so called three degrees of care and
negligence, slight care may be described as a less
degree of care than ordinary, and slight diligence
as that diligence which persons of less than common prudence take of their own concerns. Gross
negligence has been defined as an mnission of the
care which even the most inattentive and thoughtless never fail to take of their own concerns .... "

See also to the same effect, Prosser on Torts, 2nd
ed., 148.
Again we quote from United Fire Insurance Co·mpamy v. Paramount Fur Service, Inc. supra:
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"Ordinarily such constructive bailee will receive nothing frmn the owner of the property and
will have no right to recover from such owner
anything for what he does in caring for such property so that he is in effect an uncompensated
or so-called gratuitious bailee ... Hence there is
no more reason for the law imposing upon such
constructive bailee any duty to the owner with respect to care for such property than there is for
imposing such a duty on any other uncompensated
or so-called gratuitous bailee. As a result no
greater duty is ordinarily imposed upon such a
constructive bailee. .
"
The court further said :
''Although compensated bailee owes to his
bailor a duty to exercise ordinary care to protect
the bailed property, an uncompensated or socalled gratuitous bailee does not owe to his bailor
a duty to exercise such care to protect the bailed
property.

·'Par. 3 and 4 of the Syllabus of Toledo & 0.
Central R. Co. v. Bowler & Burdick Co. 63 0. St.
274, 58 N.E. 813, state that there can 'not' be such
gross negligence 'unless' there is 'that gross neglect of duty which amounts to willfulness and
evinces a reckless disregard of the rights of
others.'
''. . . In deciding this case, it is sufficient to
recognize, as all the authorities apparently do, that
an uncompensated or so-called gratuitous bailee
does not O\Ve to the owner of the bailed property
a duty to exercise ordinary care and hence is not
liable for ntere negligence with respect to the care
of such property.'' (Emphasis ours.)
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See also the cases cited in 96 A.L.R. at p. 909, et seq.
In submitting this case to the jury, the court took
the view that the destruction of the owner's airplane by
fire gave rise to an inference of negligence on the part
of defendant which would support a verdict for the plaintiff. This is undoubtedly correct in cases of bailment
for hire and the Utah cases clearly so hold. However,
we find no case from Utah or any other jurisdiction where
it has been held that the destruction of the bailed goods
by fire gives rise to an inference of gross negligence on
the part of a gratuitous bailee. In fact the authorities
hold that where, as here, the bailor has knowledge as to
the place and the manner in which the goods are to be
held, he is presumed to assent that the goods shall be so
treated and cannot maintain an action for loss or damage under such circumstances. See 6A Am. Jur. 366,
Bailments, § 259 :

"*** However, a bailor knowing the general
character and habits of a gratuitous bailee, and
the place where and the manner in which goods
deposited are to be kept, is presumed to assent
that the goods shall be so treated, and cannot
maintain an action for loss or damage under such
circumstances."
To the same effect is 8 C.J.S., Bailments, Sec. 28:
''So, where the bailor knows the habits of the
bailee and the place and the manner in which the
goods are to be kept, the law presumes his assent
that his goods shall be thus treated, and, if lost or
damaged he can maintain no action therefor.''
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Plaintiff failed to offer any specific evidence of
gross negligence on the part of defendant. There is no
authority which holds that destruction by fire, standing
alone, is evidence of gross negligence, and where the
owner has knowledge of the manner of storage, he consents and agrees to such storage. It follows, therefore,
that there was no evidence to warrant the submission
of this case to the jury on the negligence count, and a
verdict should have been directed in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff on that count, no cause of
action.
POINT III.
THE COURT DID NOT CORRECTLY INSTRUCT THE
JURY, AS TO THE RIGHTS OF PLAINTIFF, OR AS TO
THE DUTIES OF DEFENDANT, OR AS TO THE LAW OF
BAILMENT APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE.

If the court detennines adversely to our position on
the first two points, we further invite attention to the fact
that defendant was, if a bailee, at all, only a constructive
bailee and therefore held only to slight diligence or otherwise stated, liable only for gross negligence. However, in
instructing the jury in its Instruction Number 6, the court
instructed that if there was a bailment relationship, and
if the defendant was guilty of negligence, a verdict could
be returned in favor of the plaintiff on the negligence
count. This was an incorrect statement of the law since
as shown by the authorities heretofore cited, the burden
was upon the plaintiff to prove not merely ordinary
negligence, but gross neglience. Likewise, it was in-
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correct to advise the jury that the mere destruction of
the plane by fire while in the possession of the defendant
gave rise to an inference of negligence. This would be
true in a bailment for hire situation, but was not applicable to the case at bar. At the very least, the court
should have instructed the jury that the fact that defendant was a gratuitous bailee, placed upon him a lesser
duty of care than he would have had as a bailee for hire.
It follows that the plaintiff's verdict should not be permitted to stand, and that even if the evidence was sufficient to submit to the jury, a new trial should be granted
so that the jury might be properly instructed on the law
applicable to the evidence offered and received.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiff failed to prove a submissible case on the
theory of negligence. It follows that the judgment on
the second count should be set aside, and judgment entered in favor of defendant, no cause of action, or in th~
alternative, a new trial should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,

CHRISTENSEN AND JENSEN
By RAY R. CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellant
1205 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake ·City, Utah
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